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Abstract
Weak housing creditor protection, accentuated by weak landed property rights and under-
developed credit information systems constitute major constraints to housing finance 
development in many developing countries. Improving housing creditor protection require 
further institutional development and financial innovation. As a trigger of financial inno-
vation, regulation has spawned pension reforms leading to the global shift from defined 
benefit to defined contribution pension schemes, which has created new opportunities 
to improve housing creditor protection and thus engender housing finance innovations. 
This paper considers how pension assets—accumulated benefits and associated personal, 
employment and contribution information—has provided a basis for collateralized lend-
ing and an additional avenue for credit information system development. The paper pro-
poses a pension asset-backed creditor protection model that utilizes defined contribution 
pension assets to improve housing credit allocation, and thus, housing finance develop-
ment. Pension assets represent alternative or complementary collateral assets for securing 
a housing credit (mortgage). And as depositories of information, the information content 
of pension assets and institutions could also be used alternatively and complementarily to 
assess the capacity, character and contribution (equity) of potential borrowers in the credit 
underwriting process. Future applied research may consider how the proposed model 
could be integrated in existing credit underwriting systems and the operational challenges 
that could emerge.
Keywords Developing countries · Pension reforms · Housing finance innovation ·  
Pension asset-backed housing finance · Pension loans · Pension-secured loans
1 Introduction
Shelter is one of the primary needs of humans and different people in different countries 
have satisfied this need through a variety of means. While renting is economically sensible 
to some people given their economic circumstances and incentives available, many people 
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across the globe prefer homeownership. A recurring concern, however, is how to finance 
homeownership most efficiently and effectively. Housing finance has thus become a topical 
issue among researchers, policymakers and international development partners. One of the 
lessons in development across countries is summed up in Bertrand Renaud’s famous apho-
rism that ‘cities are built the way they are financed’ (Renaud 1987).
In developing countries, popular housing finance approaches include; direct govern-
ment public housing; self-help incremental housing1 (see Jones and Datta 2002; Ward and 
Macoloo 1992; Burgess 1985, 1992; Turner 1976; Abrams 1966); housing microfinance2; 
pension asset-backed housing finance3 (Donkor-Hyiaman and Owusu-Manu 2016; Mutero 
et al. 2010), and to a lesser extent, mortgage financing (Karley 2003) as shown in Fig. 1, 
although believed to be the most efficient way to finance homeownership. Bible and Joiner 
(2009) record that mortgage market growth increased American’s homeownership rate 
from 64 to 69% between 1993 and 2005. Over the same period, homeownership among 
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Fig. 1  Average mortgage credit/GDP ratios (%) across countries: 2006–2010. Source: Badev et al. (2013)
1 Owners become self-developers relying on small crafts and trades to build ‘gradually’ over 5–15 years 
using their ‘sweat equity’ (personal savings) accumulated over long periods (Mathema 1999; Tomlinson 
2007) or as and when funds become available (Donkor-Hyiaman and Owusu-Manu 2016; Derban et  al. 
2002).
2 In this approach, small and short-term unsecured loans are mixed with sweat equity in the incremental 
housing process. Informal moneylenders and informal savings and loans associations like the susu groups in 
Ghana; tanda in Mexico; hui in Vietnam; chilimba in Zambia; paluwagon in the Philippines; gamaiyah in 
Egypt; kusukus in Ethiopia are the main sources of these loans (Anzorena et al. 1998; Ferguson 1999; Mit-
lin 1997; Patel 1999; Siembieda and López Moreno 1999; Paulson and McAndrews 1998; Bouman 1995; 
Johnson and Rogaly 1997; Merrett and Russell 1994; O’Reilly 1996).
3 Pension asset-backed housing finance comes in two forms; pension loans and pension-secured (backed) 
loans (Sing 2009). The pension loan are direct loans from the fund secured in two ways: over the member’s 
ring-fenced accrued benefits in a DC scheme or effectively as a mortgage loan in favour of the fund over 
the property in question (Short et al. 2009). Pension-secured loans on the other hand are designed to enable 
potential borrowers to collateralise their accumulated pension equity as security for a housing loan from a 
third party, mostly commercial banks (ibid). Pension-secured loans are popular in Brazil, Mexico, Singa-
pore, South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Zambia and Mauritius (Donkor-Hyiaman and Owusu-Manu 2016; 
Afrane et al. 2016; Phang 2007; McCarthy et al. 2002; Addae-Dapaah and Leong 1996).
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low-income households and the first-time homebuyers market, in particular, increased by 
12 million due to growth in sub-prime mortgage lending (Gramlich 2007).
Despite its potential contribution to economic development (Asabere, McGowan and 
Lee 2016; Dickerson 2009; Renaud 2008; Jaffee 1999) by accelerating access to home-
ownership (Gevorgyan et al. 2006), mortgage lending in developing economies is limited 
inter alia by both the underdeveloped nature of credit information systems and pervasive 
collateral risk (De Soto 2001). The lack of credit information makes it difficult for lenders 
to conduct credit analysis adequately and hence exposes lenders to a high chance of lend-
ing to people who lack the capacity and or have the willingness to service their mortgage 
obligations. Theoretically, this situation will often restrict lending or discourage lending 
at all (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981).
To promote lending in a world of imperfect information between lenders and bor-
rowers, collateral is needed. Indeed, Scholars have shown that safer borrowers within an 
observationally identical risk pool pledge more collateral (Bester 1985; Chan and Kanatas 
1985; Besanko and Thakor 1987) thus improving their incentives to work hard to reduce 
their likelihood of default (Chan and Thakor 1987; Boot and Anjan Thakor 1994). Beyond 
pledging collateral per se, lenders are more willing to extend credit when they have more 
power to protect themselves ex-post by easily forcing repayment or capturing the collat-
eral in case of default through strong property rights (Townsend 1979; Aghion and Bol-
ton 1992; Hart and Moore 1994, 1998). Therefore, credit information and collateral with 
its associated property rights are substitutes in credit screening and creditor protection 
(Brown et al. 2009).
Despite land registration reforms in many developing countries particularly in Africa, 
private property rights protection is still weak due to inefficient legal systems and unre-
solved complexities of land tenure (cf. Toulmin 2008). Toulmin (2008) reveals that only 
2–3% of the land is held by written title in West Africa, mainly in a few major cities. 
Land in Africa is also largely communally held, thus creating two main problems. First, 
borrowers cannot pledge land they do not own as collateral for credit. According to 
Ollennu (1962):
Land belongs to a vast family of which many are dead, few are living and countless 
numbers are still to come. (Ollennu 1962: p. 4)
Where communal lands are pledged, lenders often cannot register mortgages against them 
(Toulmin 2008). Where registration is possible, it is often overly bureaucratic and costly. 
For example, Burkina Faso recorded the highest cost of mortgage registration and title 
transfer at 12% of property value whilst Rwanda recorded the longest registration time 
(1 year) globally (Butler et al. 2009). Inefficient legal systems in most developing countries 
render mortgage foreclosure risky and unviable. In Ghana, lenders require almost 2 years 
(i.e. 706  days) to foreclose collaterals in default (ibid). Therefore, when liens are unen-
forceable, the difference between mortgage loans and unsecured debt is marginal (Chiquier 
et al. 2004).
Besides, Africa’s urbanisation is characterised by slums and backyard houses due 
to poor urban planning and substandard housing units that are poorly maintained and/or 
developed using substandard building materials. This feature exposes lenders to collateral 
risk (Karley 2002, 2003). Therefore, weak legal systems, inefficient foreclosure processes 
and substandard collateral nullifies the benefit of real property collateral as a solution to 
credit information risks in mortgage lending ex post.
The need for alternative collateral assets has become rife. The UN-Habitat (2012) in 
a review of the housing profile of Ghana suggested that introducing a: “new regulatory 
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framework to enable alternative forms of collateral would benefit housing financing” 
(p. 26). Given the shift from defined benefit to defined contribution pension schemes, 
which ring-fences the contributions of each pension member and thus offers clear private 
property rights, pension assets have emerged as alternative collateral assets for housing 
finance. Jones and Datta (2002) suggest that deregulation and reforms have spawned inno-
vation and a wider interpretation of the concept of collateral. In effect, innovation of new 
arrangements will alter the way that lenders and borrowers interact (Bodie 1990).
Pension asset-backed housing finance has thus become popular in recent times in many 
countries including Brazil, Mexico, South Africa Botswana, Namibia, Kenya, Zambia and 
Mauritius (Donkor-Hyiaman and Owusu-Manu 2016). In spite of this innovation in hous-
ing finance enabling the collateralization of pension assets as an alternative to real property 
collaterals for mortgages, lenders still face an arduous challenge in assessing the credit-
worthiness of potential homeowners. This challenge is due to the underdeveloped nature 
of credit information systems. This may be due to a cultural aversion to debt (Teye et al. 
2015) and the high level of financial exclusion4 in Africa in particular and thus the unfa-
miliarity of many Africans with formal credit and its obligations (Karley 2003). Therefore, 
private credit information systems such as credit bureaus are unviable and are unlikely to 
emerge (Pagano and Jappelli 1993).
The need for alternative information sources for the development of credit information 
systems to enable the establishment of the creditworthiness of potential borrowers is thus 
increasing. This study therefore develops a model that proposes the use of pension fund 
data for credit assessment. This is based on the idea that some of the information require-
ments for credit assessment can be obtained from pension funds. Credit assessment based 
on the five Cs lending criteria, i.e. capacity, character, capital, collateral, and condition is 
quite standard in the credit market (Karley 2002). Four of these parameters, i.e. capacity, 
character, capital, collateral could be assessed from pension fund data as will be shown 
later.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Immediately following this section is a 
discussion of the research approach, followed by a discussion of the potential of pension 
assets in relation to the five Cs lending criteria. This is followed by a presentation of the 
proposed model.
2  Research approach
The design of the Pension Asset-Backed Creditor Protection Model is informed by the con-
cept of financial innovation entwined with the creative and imaginative theory of concep-
tualization (CITC). CITC is based on an ‘openness to change’ psychology—that is, the 
extent to which an individual is imaginative, inquisitive and refined (Egan 2005). Con-
sequently, the creative and imaginative behaviors of the authors underpin the conception 
of the conceptual model and its scientific jurisdiction (Zhou 2003). An iterative research 
approach adopted for this paper draws upon three core aspects, namely: (1) a critical lit-
erature review of relevant pension asset-backed housing finance models and schemes to 
4 The World Bank Global Financial Development Indicators for example, illustrate that: there are only 15 
bank accounts for every 100 adults in the median African country, while there are 42 outside Africa; and 
there are 3.1 branches per 100,000 adults in Africa, while there are 9.6 outside Africa. In Ghana, Boamah 
(2011) notes that only 10% of the bankable population has bank accounts.
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identify the various ways through which pension fund capitalism has engendered housing 
finance innovations globally; (2) the creative and imaginative theory of conceptualization 
(Collins and Cooke 2011; Egan 2005); and (3) the concept of financial innovation (Lerner 
and Tufano 2011; Miller 1986).
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD 2005) define 
innovation in modern industries as a process of adopting new approaches to design and 
business models. Ramadani and Gerguri (2010) concur with this aforementioned definition 
and add that innovation represents an activity of creating new, or enhancing existing prod-
ucts or services, technological process and organizations. This process is the instrument of 
entrepreneurship—the act that endows resources with a new capacity to generate wealth 
(Drucker 1998). Wealth is an output of innovation, which results in a higher level of eco-
nomic welfare and is the essence of economic growth (Engelen et al. 2008). Miller (1986) 
defines financial innovation as something that produces economic growth in excess of what 
would otherwise occur. This includes the act of creating and then popularising new finan-
cial instruments as well as new financial technologies, institutions and markets (Lerner and 
Tufano 2011). This functional characterization of financial innovation gives rise to classi-
fication of types, which according to Schrieder and Heidhues (1995) is useful in three dis-
tinctions: (1) financial system/institutional innovation—which relates to changes in busi-
ness structures, to establish new types of financial intermediaries, or to change the legal 
and supervisory framework which can affect the financial sector as a whole (Engelen et al. 
2008). Important examples include formalizing informal finance systems, or setting up a 
completely new service structure; (2) process innovation—which relates to the introduction 
of new business processes leading to increased efficiency, and market expansion (cf. Fager-
berg 2003); and (3) product innovation—which relates to the introduction of new products 
or services including new credit, i.e. adjustable-rate mortgages, home equity loans, vari-
able rate bonds, zero-coupon bonds and hire purchase, which are created to meet market 
needs—client-focused (Bátiz-Lazo and Woldensebet 2006). Product innovations are intro-
duced to respond better to changes in market demand by filling a gap in the products and 
services available to customers or to improve the efficiency of supply (Schrieder and Hei-
dhues 1995).
Previous discussions on the triggers of financial innovation are little more than a list-
ing of factors, which include: regulations and taxes; computer and technological advances; 
and finance theory (Miller 1986; Merton 1995). Tufano (2003) notes that market problems 
inter alia constitute the dominant idea that creates the impulse to innovate as an optimal 
response. These market problems include incomplete markets, agency concerns and infor-
mation asymmetries (ibid). This perception is an apolitical and mechanical view focused 
on solving what are essentially technical problems of markets around the issues of infor-
mation and pricing. The benefits of financial innovation permeate throughout society and 
include enhancing the sustainability of institutions and their outreach to the poor (Schrieder 
and Heidhues 1995). According to Engelen et al. (2008), financial innovation is a power-
ful and convenient metaphor for progress which secures real social benefits that facilitate 
risk dispersion and pooling through the financial system. This improves the allocation of 
capital, creation of liquidity and democratises the availability of credit, thus making market 
pricing and risk more accurate, easily manageable and welfare enhancing for lenders, bor-
rowers and the general economy (Bernanke 2007). Innovations can increase the availability 
of credit to households and corporations’ through greater provision of financial products 
(Hamilton et al. 2007). Financial innovation is therefore fundamental for promoting good 
economic performance (Lipsky 2007) and engendering social equality through equitable 
access to finance for home ownership (Blundell-Wignall 2007, p. 2).
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2.1  The model design and development process
Five inextricably linked processes were involved in the design and development of the 
conceptual model (see Fig. 2). First, initial discussions were held with other academics 
and industry practitioners to develop the concept proposal (see Donkor-Hyiaman and 
Owusu-Manu 2016; Afrane et al. 2014). Second, a critical review of extant literature on 
pension asset-backed housing finance commenced with a specific focus on the concept, 
design of pension funds and practice (Sing 2009; Short et al. 2009; Rakodi 1995; Reddy 
and Brijlal 1992; Karley 2003). This process identified two main channels (collateral 
and information) through which pension assets could be useful in mitigating lending risk 
in mortgage lending. Third, the model was designed and developed through assimilat-
ing three dimensions of financial innovation (i.e. product, process and institutional) via 
CITC.
Fourth, robust validation and testing of the conceptual model was achieved through 
independent peer reviews obtained from two pension fund management practitioners and 
two housing finance researchers. This review specifically sought to identify the model’s 
practical and theoretical challenges. A practical issue identified during this stage of the 
process is the likelihood that an individual’s accumulated pension may be insufficient to 
collateralize for a housing loan. A potential remedy is offered via cross or co-collaterali-
zation which involves third parties (such as family and friends) either on a commercial or 
mutual basis, lending collateral to potential borrowers. This could resolve the theoretical 
problem of using the same pension assets and subsequent contributions for collateral and 
loan repayment. In this case, new pension fund members or non-members could borrow 
collateral to secure a housing loan.
Fig. 2  Design process of the pension asset-backed risk mitigation model
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3  Credit analysis, risk mitigation and creditor protection: what have 
pension assets wrought?
For lending to take place, financial institutions would generally want to establish that 
basic requirements are met. These requirements relate to the circumstances of the poten-
tial borrower, property, and the environment in which lending occurs. These require-
ments could be classified as the five Cs lending criteria—capacity, character, capital, 
collateral, and condition. Although other requirements may be fulfilled, lenders often 
ensure that these basic requirements are met.
Before delving into how pension assets could play a role in credit assessments, it is 
imperative to understand the basis for pension asset-backed housing finance. Pensions 
are deferred incomes receivable upon retirement, except where legislation allows mem-
bers to utilize pension savings to meet other composite needs, including health, edu-
cation and housing before retirement (Sing 2009; Holzmann et al. 2005; Bodie 1990). 
However, the United Nations Development Programme Human Development Report 
(2014) raise a concern that most African’s do not attain the pensionable age of 65 years 
to enjoy their pensions in retirement, as shown in Fig. 3. The average life expectancy 
across Sub-Saharan Africa is a mere 54.9 years. At a country level, life expectancy in 
Ghana, Kenya and Cameroon is 64.6, 57.5 and 52.1 years respectively (ibid). Recently, 
the United Nation Children’s Fund [UNICEF] (2014) estimated that the average Afri-
can life expectancy of 58 years is about 12 years less than the global average. Investing 
substantially in pensions that may not be redeemed raises serious questions about the 
purpose, use and value of pension funds in Africa. Some commenters opine that pension 
funds are a foreign ideal and incongruent with basic welfare needs of people living in 
developing countries. Sing (2009) for example argues that:
Fig. 3  Average life expectancy at birth for the world reached 71.4 years in 2015. Source: United Nations 
(2017)
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Prudent regulation emphasises the need to preserve retirement savings for fund mem-
bers’ old age. However, what is the use of being assured of a comfortable retirement 
without a roof over one’s head today? (p. 68).
Pension assets could therefore play a role in the development of housing finance in Africa 
as discussed below.
3.1  Capital
Capital in mortgage credit analysis is the equity contribution a potential borrower makes 
towards a mortgage. This is often accumulated through savings. Pension funds are sav-
ings and investment schemes. Their investment in housing take two main forms: (1) end-
user models, and (2) investment models (Short et al. 2009). The investment model involves 
direct housing development while end-user models, which is the focus of this section, 
assist a pension fund member to obtain housing capital for home purchase or construc-
tion (Donkor-Hyiaman and Owusu-Manu 2016). This type of housing finance may be in 
form of pension loans and pension-backed loans (Sing 2009), collectively called pension 
asset-backed housing finance (Donkor-Hyiaman and Owusu-Manu 2016). Administered 
internally by the pension fund or through a designated administrator, pension loans ena-
ble members of pension funds to borrow their accumulated pensions capital as a mort-
gage (Short et al. 2009). Where the accumulated pension capital is inadequate for the pur-
chase of a house, it could serve as an equity contribution or down payment for a mortgage 
(Donkor-Hyiaman and Owusu-Manu 2016). Pension loans are common  in Singapore, 
Mexico, Brazil, South Africa, Zambia and Uganda as shown in Table 1.
3.2  Collateral
Mortgage finance is secured against the value of the purchased property. Lenders estimate 
the viability of repossession on default and whether the property can be sold to repay the 
loan. Suitability of the property is assessed on the basis of its legal status, location, struc-
ture and market value (Karley 2002). Land tenure problems in many developing countries 
make it difficult to use real property as collateral. Pension assets have thus been used in 
many countries as alternative collateral to support housing finance. Pension-secured loans 
are designed to enable potential borrowers to collateralise their accumulated pension equity 
as security for a housing loan from a third party, mostly commercial banks (Short et  al. 
2009). These are permitted in Brazil, Mexico, South Africa Botswana, Namibia, Zambia 
and Mauritius. For example, the Central Provident Fund (CPF) and INFONAVIT (Castillo 
and Laviada 1999) in Singapore and Mexico respectively are multi-pillar defined contribu-
tion (DC) scheme which allows members to use their accrued pension benefits in the ‘ordi-
nary account’ for housing purposes. In Ghana, Section 103(2) of the National Pension Act, 
2008 (Act 766) allows for pension-secured loans (Afrane et al. 2014; Donkor-Hyiaman and 
Owusu-Manu 2016).
Pension-secured loans work best in DC pension schemes, which ring-fences members’ 
account, and thus ensures that a default in loan repayment does not affect other members of 
the pension fund. Table 1 notably illustrates that most of the pension asset-backed housing 
finance models are associated with DC schemes, with the exception of Namibia, Tanzania, 
Kenya and Zambia, where DB schemes are also linked to pension asset-backed housing 
finance. In DC pension schemes, accrued pension assets are based on the amounts credited 
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to members’ accounts (through employer contributions and if applicable, employee con-
tributions) plus any investment returns. Ownership is clearly defined, which enhances 
the chances of effectively foreclosing on pension asset collaterals upon loan default cet-
eris paribus. For instance, the opportunity to collateralize pension assets as against tying 
the loan to a house (as security) relieved lenders of the arduous circumstance and time 
involved in evicting borrowers upon default in South Africa. In this case, the outstanding 
loan amount is deducted from defaulting borrowers’ accrued pension benefits.
Liquidity is enhanced via the capital market. This benefits pricing as pension-secured 
loans are cheaper than micro-finance, unsecured finance and mortgage-secured bank lend-
ing in South Africa. According to Sing (2009), the interest rate of ‘prime rate 1%’ for the 
average pension-secured loan, was found to be cheaper than mortgage lending (at prime 
rate) and significantly cheaper than unsecured lend (prime + 5%). However, in Uganda, 
although no interest is charged on the loan, the scheme retains 1% of the loan amount to 
service the cost of land title verification and to meet monitoring costs of ensuring that loans 
are used for housing, which is an issue in South Africa (Sing 2009).
Pension-secured loans have contributed considerably to housing finance development. 
In Brazil and Mexico, the Fundo de Garantia por Tempo de Serviço (FGTS), and the Insti-
tute Nacional del Fondo de Vivienda para los Trabajadores (INFONAVIT) and Fondo 
de Vivienda del Institute de Seguridad y de Servicios para los Trabajadores del Estado 
(FOVISSSTE) respectively are the biggest savings institutions that serve mainly low-
income households and have supplied circa 3.631 million (through the Caixa Economica 
Federal (CEF) according to UN-Habitat 2010) and 3.5 million housing units (International 
Monetary Fund 2007). The CEF and INFONAVIT and FOVISSSTE account for over 
55–60% of housing finance (or mortgage market portfolio) in Brazil and Mexico respec-
tively (Herbert et al. 2012; International Monetary Fund 2007). This is equivalent to about 
93.6% of funds held by INFONAVIT and FOVISSSTE (UN-Habitat 2010).
Between 1970 and 2008, the Housing Development Board’s (HDB) pension loans-to-
total housing loans averaged about 58% in Singapore (cf. McCarthy et al. 2002). Accord-
ingly, pension-secured loans contributed to the increase in homeownership from 26% in 
1970 to about 90% in the 1990s (Phang 2007). Addae-Dapaah and Leong (1996) note that 
pension contributions are more than enough to meet monthly repayments of an average 
purchaser. In South Africa, pension-secured loans and pension loans amounted to about 
R17 billion (£1.1127 billion) as at 2009 (Sing 2009). According to the Centre for Afford-
able Housing Finance in Africa, there are about 850,000 outstanding pension-backed loans, 
based on average loan size of about R20,000.
3.3  Capacity
A borrower’s financial ability is critical in the credit analysis process. Capacity is usually 
assessed using the ratio that expresses the percentage of an applicant’s income needed to 
cover monthly debt obligations, including the mortgage repayments -  the house-debt-to-
income ratio (Karley 2002). This assessment requires household income and expenditure 
data, which for many people in developing economies, characterised by large informality 
may be difficult to obtain. The available data may also be scanty and unreliable because of 
the difficulty in verifying it. Problems with access to income data of pension fund members 
may be solved since the pension contribution is often a percentage of their incomes. In 
other words, the size of a contributor’s income over time could be estimated by dividing 
the amount contributed monthly by the contribution rate. This estimation could be done 
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to provide insight into the distribution of members’ reported income and changes in their 
capacity over time.
3.4  Character
Character referencing is a major constrain to mortgage loan underwriting and risk-based 
pricing in developing economies due to a paucity of credit information systems (such as 
private credit bureaus). In developed countries, lenders use credit reports generated from 
credit performance data sourced from financial institutions by private credit bureaus and 
public credit registers to assess the character of borrowers. This information provides 
a proxy for estimating the willingness and probability of potential borrowers to service 
their debts. However, high levels of financial exclusion and debt aversion in some Afri-
can developing economies (Teye et al. 2015) means that the volume of data may be small 
with low mobile pools of borrowers and high costs of exchanging information—a situa-
tion that cumulatively impedes the emergence of credit information systems (Jappelli and 
Pagano 1993). Credit bureaus are relatively new institutions in Africa with limited access 
to the market. However, existing institutions such as pension schemes are depositories of 
information that might be useful character proxies for loan underwriting purposes. At least, 
three categories of information about prospective borrowers could be extracted from pen-
sion funds—namely, personal information, employment information and pension contribu-
tion performance information.
3.4.1  Personal and employment information
In Ghana for example, the Social Security and National Insurance Trust’s (SSNIT) mem-
bership form and the address details form collects bio-data information via four main sec-
tions completed by the applicant. Sections one, two and three collect information of: the 
name of the applicant; names of applicant’s parents respectively; and the current mailing 
address (including information on applicant’s postal address, email address, mobile and 
telephone numbers, region of residence). Section four collects information of the appli-
cant’s residential address including house number, building name, street name, city, loca-
tion and region. Moreover, apart from other bio-data (such as the age, sex, date of birth, 
marital status, number of children), the membership form also collects employment details. 
This includes name of employer, industry by implication, position at work and income. 
This information is useful to creditors for loan application screening purposes.
3.4.2  Pension contribution performance information
Credit reports often include a summary of information such as the number and type of 
accounts that are past due or in good standing, and detailed accounts information related to 
high balances and the date accounts were opened. In Ghana for instance, pension contribu-
tions into the first and second tier pension schemes are liabilities (debt) to both employers 
and employees but the employer is obliged to remit the contributions to the SSNIT and 
the private pension fund managers respectively. This fiscal obligation reveals information 
about the character of prospective loan applicants which could be utilized in creditworthi-
ness assessments.
Figure 4 illustrates some of the useful information content that could be generated from 
the distribution to pension contribution remittances as a proxy for character referencing 
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and thus vital for loan underwriting. Points A and B represent the beginning and end of 
each month respectively. The distance B-O is the 14-day period after the end of a month 
within which pension contributions are to be remitted to the approved pension fund man-
ager by statute. That means that remittances after this period are in default. In finance the-
ory, default is failure to meet the legal obligations (or conditions) of a loan (O’Sullivan and 
Sheffrin 2003). However, there might be some delays in practice, which may be out of the 
control of the borrower like delays in payment of salaries. Thus, the default period can be 
separated into two. The first we shall call a grace period, labelled O-C, which may also be 
referred to as the delinquency period or technical default period accounts for such practi-
cal delays. In this vein, Krainer and Laderman (2011) notes that the mortgage delinquency 
rate was defined to be loans past-due 60 days or more, plus foreclosures between 1980 and 
2005, in the United States.
Conversely, in the Mortgage Encyclopaedia, Guttentag (2004) defines a delinquency 
as a mortgage payment that is more than 30 days late. Payments not received after point C 
are in actual default. The information content of the distance from B and beyond could be 
used to generate an aging schedule. That is, an accounting table that shows the relationship 
between a company’s or a person’s bills and invoices and its due dates—for both accounts 
payable and accounts receivable to help determine whether pension fund members and 
their employers are current on their pension contribution remittances and whether they are 
paying it on time. Based on the distribution of pension contribution remittances, default 
probabilities could be estimated and utilized as a proxy for a potential borrower’s charac-
ter, as well as the factors that might be driving default for purposes of loan underwriting. 
In essence, information from the pension scheme setup has adverse selection and moral 
hazard mitigation effects that may enhance credit allocation and reduce credit rationing in 
developing countries where credit information systems have not emerged.
Fig. 4  Pension contribution remittance schedule
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4  Integrating pension assets into mortgage underwriting: pension 
asset‑backed creditor protection model
Figure 5 presents a conceptual framework through which pension asset could be innova-
tively used to mitigate lending risks and promote housing finance development. The model 
consists of four agents: (1) pension fund member; (2) pension fund; (3) primary lenders; 
and (4) secondary lenders. The pension fund member makes monthly contributions to the 
pension fund to accumulate benefits over time. The pension loan model enables a member 
to borrow his or her accumulated pension benefits for housing purposes. Alternatively, the 
pension-secured loan model, allows the member to post their accumulated benefits as col-
lateral often to a third party (primary lender)—financial institution—such as a bank for 
a mortgage. The primary lender could enhance its liquidity position and reduce its risk 
by selling the pension-secured loans on its balance sheet to a secondary lender—includ-
ing institutional investors such as insurance firms and pension funds. To mitigate adverse 
selection ex ante when there is limited information on prospective borrowers (who are also 
members of the pension fund) due to the lack of formal credit information systems, the 
lenders in the model (i.e. pension fund and banks) could use the pension assets to assess 
the creditworthiness of the borrower and thus screen the loan application.
Since pension assets provide partial information about a borrower, lenders cannot 
make a perfect prediction of a borrower’s behaviour after advancing the loan, hence 
they must also mitigate the consequences of default (moral hazard) when the property to 
be purchased is not mortgageable. Often, this is due to land titling and property rights 
problems in most developing economies. The accumulated pension benefits of the bor-
rower could then be pledged to the lender as security for the loan, in order to internalize 
Fig. 5  Pension asset-backed risk mitigation model
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possible moral hazards. Indeed, moral hazard models developed using collateral theory 
indicate that posting collateral improves borrowers’ incentives to work hard, thus reduc-
ing their likelihood of default (Chan and Thakor 1987; Boot and Anjan Thakor 1994). 
This effort could be maximized particularly in view of the possibility of a borrower los-
ing their pension benefits in the event of default. Additionally, the posting of accumu-
lated pension benefits as collateral could also signal borrower quality ex ante when it is 
difficult to distinguish potential borrowers. Adverse selection models predict that safer 
borrowers within an observationally identical risk pool pledge more collateral (Chan 
and Kanatas 1985).
Given the low levels of income in Africa at large, individual pension asset values may 
be low and therefore provide partial security to lenders when collateralized for a mortgage. 
Although a challenge, it could open new vistas of innovations. For example, opportunities 
for co-collateralization could emerge where borrowers with inadequate accumulated ben-
efits could borrow at a fee, the accumulated benefits of other pension fund members. Alter-
natively, opportunities for cross-collateralization may be possible—when the collateral for 
one loan is also used as collateral for another loan.
Besides using pension assets as collaterals and alternative character referencing tech-
nology, the pension contribution rate (in terms of size and frequency) is linked to the size 
and stability of income as well as the security of employment—these indicators are useful 
for assessing the capacity of potential borrowers to repay a loan. In addition, pension sav-
ings could form a vital equity contribution (down payment) for a mortgage. Low levels 
of income coupled with a high cost of living in most developing countries severely con-
strains household savings. Studies in South Africa and Ghana note the general lack of sav-
ings to fulfil the initial deposit requirement for mortgages (Karley 2002, 2003). However, 
Edwards (1995) notes that, sophisticated financial products like pension asset-backed hous-
ing finance have increased the rate of savings. Likewise, Morandé (1998) found that funded 
pension funds increased savings in Chile which improved the ability of pension fund mem-
bers to raise down payments for a mortgage.
Moreover, deferred liabilities of pension funds mean they usually have long-term 
investible funds that match the long-term (usually about 20–30  years) capital needs of 
housing finance (Afrane et  al. 2014; Sing 2009). This characteristic of pension funds is 
vital for eliminating the maturity gap problem created by the prevalent use of short-term 
funds in financing long-term housing assets. Therefore, the asset-liability matching char-
acteristics of pension funds could reduce liquidity risk and liquidity risk premium, and in 
turn result in low interest rates (Afrane et al. 2014). This relationship could have the effect 
of lowering loan repayment amounts, improve affordability and expand housing finance 
opportunities (Chiquier and Lea 2009). Coupled with guarantees that are typically pro-
vided by the pension schemes, the average pension asset-backed housing loan is likely to 
be cheaper than a conventional mortgage, as is the case in South Africa (Sing 2009).
Further, payroll deduction is often a feature of mandatory pension schemes; for exam-
ple, the first tier and second tier pension scheme in Ghana. Where pension contributions 
are to be used as housing loan repayment, the payroll deduction mechanism could be useful 
in mitigating moral hazards; i.e. loan defaults. Payroll deduction of pension-secured loan 
repayments removes borrowers’ unwillingness to service their debt compared to the case 
where loan payments are not deducted as source. Since pension asset-backed housing loan 
payments are payroll deducted (i.e. in South Africa), an aspect of loan delinquency and 
default depends on employers’ characteristics. However, ceteris paribus payroll deduction 
should lower default risk to the advantage of both lenders and borrowers. While investment 
losses to lenders may be reduced, potential borrowers may benefit in terms of lower default 
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risk premiums that will result in lower interest rates, lower repayments and an improve-
ment in affordability.
5  Conclusion
Well-developed housing finance systems and institutions promote housing market develop-
ment. Most developing economies are however plagued with weak legal and information 
institutions  beside other problems. For instance, land administration inefficiencies have 
rendered most lands unregistered, putting land title and ownership at risk, thereby increas-
ing collateral risk. High financial exclusion on the other hand has rendered formal credit 
information systems underdeveloped and non-existent in some countries. Most potential 
borrowers are therefore credit rationed because lenders cannot distinguish between good 
and bad borrowers. In effect, formal housing finance and housing markets remain underde-
veloped. Nevertheless, regulation has spawned pension reforms—the move from DB pen-
sion schemes to DC pensions Schemes—that has expanded the set of assets that can be col-
lateralize for a mortgage and created new opportunities for credit information referencing 
and screening.
Based on the concept of financial innovation interlinked with the creative and imagi-
native theory of conceptualization, this paper develops a conceptual model—the pension 
asset-backed lending risk mitigation model—that utilizes pension assets—accumulated 
benefits and associated information—to reduce adverse selection and moral hazards in 
mortgage lending. Pension-secured loans for instance enable the collateralization of pen-
sion assets as security for housing finance, which is a major source of housing finance 
in Singapore, Brazil, Mexico and emerging in some African countries including South 
Africa, Kenya, Tanzania and Ghana. The information content of pension assets such as the 
personal and employment data as well as the distribution of pension contributions could 
be used to predict the character of potential borrowers. This proposed mechanism could 
thus serve as alternative or complementary credit referencing mechanisms in countries like 
Ghana where traditional private credit bureaus have not emerged on a significant scale. 
Further studies could look into the practical challenges in operationalizing the pension 
asset-backed creditor protection model.
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